Abstract: The division of Ancient Platonism into Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism is a fairly new one. The conceptual foundation of this division was cemented in Jacob Brucker's pioneering Historia critica philosophiae (1742-67). In the 1770s and 1780s, the term 'Neoplatonism' was coined on the basis of Brucker's analysis. Three historiographical concepts were decisive to Brucker: 'system of philosophy', 'eclecticism' and 'syncretism'. By means of these concepts, he characterized Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism as opposing philosophical movements, the former being a genuine form of Platonism, the latter a false form. However, the division is untenable and we ought to abandon it.
Introduction
In the 1740s, when the German historian and Lutheran minister Johann Jacob Brucker (1696 Brucker ( -1770 established the history of philosophy as a philosophical discipline, he characterized Neoplatonism, as we now call it, as an 'eclectic sect' and as 'Alexandrian philosophy'. By means of this terminology, he intended to separate Neoplatonism from the earlier Platonic tradition, Middle Platonism in particular. These two phases of ancient Platonism differed by nature, according to Brucker. In the last third of the eighteenth century, the labels 'eclectic sect' and 'Alexandrian philosophy' were replaced by the term 'Neoplatonism'. ago an eclectic school was introduced by Potamo of Alexandria, who made a selection from the tenets of all the existing sects.' (Translation by R. D. Hicks.) In the 17th and 18th centuries, it was debated whether this Potamo mentioned by Laertius was identical with the Potamo mentioned in Porphyry's Vita Plotini (9) . 2 Brucker refused the identification, but claimed that Alexandrian theology introduced sectarian eclecticism into Alexandrian philosophy, thereby distorting genuine Greek Platonism. Brucker's compatriot, the Leipzig professor Gottfried Olearius (1672 Olearius ( -1715 , theologian and philologist, had prepared this view of so-called Alexandrian philosophy in 1711. It was Brucker, however, who cemented a sharp historiographical divide between Middle Platonism (ca. 80 BCE to ca. 220 CE) and Neoplatonism (ca. 200 to ca. 550 CE), identifying eclecticism and sectarianism as distinctive features of the latter.
3 Hence, Brucker is no unimportant source of one of our concepts in history of philosophy, ancient eclecticism, or Neoplatonism.
Despite the considerable work that has been lavished on ancient eclecticism, the meaning of the ancient 'eclectic sect' in Brucker's work has not yet been examined. Nor has its methodological implications for our interpretation I Brucker's historiographical categories:
'system', 'eclecticism', and 'syncretism'
Brucker, in his Historia critica philosophiae (1742-67), broke with the biographical model of writing the history of philosophy, as exemplified by Laertius. He also broke with 'philosophical history' (historia philosophica), largely inspired by Laertius, which was typical of seventeenth-and early eighteenth-century historians like Thomas Stanley. 5 Such historians, Brucker contended, ignored the systems of past thinkers, and they failed to exercise their critical power of judgement. 6 Contrary to these predecessors, Brucker wanted to write a 'critical history of philosophy' (historia critica philosophiae), which should assess two is- 4 Neither of these two tasks has been undertaken in the following literature on ancient eclelcticism: Zeller (1923) , III.1: 547-64, follows to a considerable extent Brucker's characterization of Neoplatonism as eclecticism. We find no examination of these two issues in Nieke (1972) ; Hager (1983) ; Holzhey (1983) ; Meinhardt (1984) ; Dreitzel (1991), 288-92; Schneider (1998) . Franz (2003) , 19-24, addresses Brucker's juxtaposition of Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism, the latter explained as eclecticism; Franz seems to think that the division is justified (ibid., 20-1). Donini (1988) , 23-33, rightly objects to Zeller's characterization of Neoplatonism as eclecticism, but does not extend his exploration to include Brucker. 5 Malusa (1993) , 161-370 6 For Stanley as a follower of Laertius, see Brucker (1742-67) , I: 36.24-28. sues: First, was the system a logically coherent complex of principles (principia) and deductions made from these principles? And did it cover all branches of philosophy? Second, were the principles in the system, and the doctrines derived from them, in conformity with Protestant doctrine? I shall not deal with the second normative issue here, focusing my attention instead on the first. 7 What did Brucker mean by 'system of philosophy'? He stipulates four features: (a) A system of philosophy, comprising principles and doctrines within various branches of philosophy, is autonomous in regard to other, non-philosophical disciplines such as medicine, astronomy, theology, etc. (b) All philosophical doctrines within a system of philosophy are deduced from one or a few principles. (Here the term 'principle' is used in the logical sense of a hypothesis.) (c) A system of philosophy, made up of doctrines deduced from principles, comprises all branches of philosophy. (d) The doctrines stated within the various branches of philosophy are internally coherent.
8
This essentialistic idea of past philosophy, consisting of such philosophical systems, may appear anachronistic to a modern historian of philosophy. However, it conformed to trends in the contemporary methodology of science, and it transformed -at least in the eyes of Brucker's contemporaries -'philosophical history' (historia philosophica) into a respectable philosophical discipline: It was no longer a history, it was no longer antiquarianism; it was the 'history of philosophy' (historia philosophiae).
The historiographical concept of a system of philosophy was a methodological innovation of seventeenth-century philosophy and science, which Brucker applied universally to past philosophy from Thales onwards. 9 Brucker's historiographical concept gained a dominant role in the ensuing tradition of general histories of philosophy. It is important to note, however, that before the seventeenth century the axiomatic-deductive methodological ideal was unknown as an all-embracing method for determining the doctrinal content of the various branches of a given philosophy. Of course, logical demonstration from premises had been known since Aristotle, but although this method allowed philosophers to use key concepts across his or her writings, it did not require the philosopher  7 For this normative issue, see Catana (2008) , 147-91. 8 For these four features, see Brucker (1742-67) , I: 3.6-16, 15.10-18 . 9 For its employment on Thales, see Catana (2008) . 64-72. to depart from the same few premises in all of his theories, as in the case of Brucker's system concept; on the contrary, Aristotle had proposed a pluralistic methodology in which different branches of philosophy were dealt with from different premises, depending on the matter at hand. 10 Brucker's historiographical concept is thus inadequate and anachronistic when applied to texts belonging to the pre-modern period. Admittedly, the term 'system' (in Greek σύστημα, in Latin systema) was known in antiquity in various contexts, such as organization theory, musicology, biology and astronomy, but it was not employed in a methodological context before the seventeenth century.
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Hence, the methodological concept denoted by the term 'system' was foreign to pre-seventeenth-century philosophy.
12 This is not to say that pre-modern philosophy was without method and order, only that these methods and orders were different and must be approached independently of Brucker's generic system concept.
Below I examine Brucker's application of the concept 'system of philosophy' and two other concepts which are related to the system concept, and which are central to his characterization of Neoplatonism, nameley 'eclecticism' and 'syncretism'. The first of these two concepts, 'eclecticism', denotes a successfully construed system of philosophy, characterized by the philosopher's independent selection of principles in the system. Moreover, there is an internal logical coherence among these principles themselves, and the derivations made from these principles are logically valid. The eclectic philosopher is the hero in Brucker's narrative, as I shall explain in a moment.
The second concept is 'syncretism', denoting an incoherent and unsuccessfully construed system of philosophy, typically undertaken by an unoriginal thinker enslaved by the prejudices of one or several traditions. 13 The outcome of syncretism is a patchwork of incoherent principles and doctrines. 14 A syncretis- 10 Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics I.3 11 See Ritschl (1906) and Catana (2008) . 12 Here I side with Hadot (1995) , 76. For a discussion of the inadequacy of the historiographical concept in regard to philosophy produced before the seventeenth century, see Catana (2008) , 35-145. 13 For Proclus as an example of an ancient syncretist, see Brucker (1742-67) , . For a Renaissance Platonist and syncretist, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, who, according to Brucke, was enslaved by traditions and thus burdened with their prejudices; see Brucker (1742-67) , IV: 59.38-60.4. For ancient eclecticism, see Nieke (1972) , Donini (1988) , Dillon (1988) and Hatzimichali (2011) . For eclecticism in Brucker and his contemporaries, see Albrecht (1994) and Schneider (1998) . For 'eclecticism' versus 'syncretism' in Brucker, see Franz (2003), 21-2; Catana (2008), 11-34. 14 For Brucker on syncretism, see Catana (2008 ), 22-31. Diderot (1755 retains this distinction. tic philosopher's reason is ensnared by the prejudices of traditions and authorities and therefore unable to choose freely the principles that are foundational to the system. The syncretist's reason may be hampered by an uncontrolled imagination, provoked by a medical condition caused by an excess of black bile or melancholy. Given this poor cognitive constitution, a syncretist is unable to advance sound and valid premises that are understandable to a human mind; instead, the syncretist offers, at best, beautiful postulates, which are not reasoned, but which one can choose to believe in, if persuaded. 15 As we shall see, Neoplatonic philosophers were syncretists, devoid of the cognitive skills pertinent to admirable eclecticism.
Before Brucker, the term 'syncretist' had acquired negative connotations at Lutheran universities in Wittenberg and Helmstedt at the end of the sixteenth century, denoting theological positions that were perceived as heterodox. 16 Although Brucker mainly used the term 'syncretist' in a historiographical context, not in a theological, his use tacitly affirmed these negative connotations among Lutherans, and the usage was in harmony with his occupation as a Lutheran minister.
According to Brucker, there were two important eclectic movements in the history of philosophy, that of ancient Neoplatonism, and that of early modern philosophy. René Descartes (1596-1650) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1648-1716) feature as eclectics from the second movement. Brucker represented Neoplatonism, or the secta eclectica, as he called it, as one single and multi-authored system of philosophy; the systems of modern eclectics, on the other hand, he represented as individual systems of philosophy elaborated by individual philosophers. 15 Brucker (1742-67) , II: 444.20-23: 'Non enim rationes dari, aut ex principiis deduci conclusiones, aut ullo modo veritatis characteres in ea re detegi posse ab intellectu humano contendit, sed artifici tantum in hac arte pulchra credendum esse postulat.' Plotinus is depicted similarly; see ibid., II: 227.10-18. In quotations from seventeenth-and eighteenth-century Latin texts, I have expanded abbreviations, changed '&' to 'et', 'u' and 'v' , omitted accents, and changed 'j' uniformly to 'i'. Otherwise I have retained the orthography and punctuation of the editions I have used. I have modernised the capitalisation and accents in quotations from Greek. 16 Franz (2003) , 22 n. 14 17 For the ancient secta eclectia, i.e. Neoplatonism, see Brucker (1742-67) , II: 189-462. For Descartes as an eclectic philosopher, see ibid., V: 10.33-40; for Leibniz as an eclectic philosopher, see ibid., V: 11. Diderot (1755) similarly distinguishes between ancient eclecticism (270) (271) (272) (273) (274) (275) (276) (277) (278) (279) (280) (281) (282) (283) (285) (286) (287) (288) (289) (290) (291) (292) (293) and sixteenth-and seventeenth-century eclecticism (271, 283-5). Diderot's account of the system in ancient eclecticism, in Diderot (1755) , 285-92, relies heavily on Brucker (1742-67), II: 393-462, although he omits some of the orthodox parts, e.g. Brucker's comparison of Christian Trinity with the Neoplatonic system (Brucker [1742-67] , II: 410-1). Diderot Contrary to modern parlance, where eclecticism tends to be synonymous with unoriginal and worthless philosophy, Brucker regarded eclecticism as original and esteemed it highly; the eclectic philosopher is able to choose his principles and use them to construe a system of philosophy in an original, emancipated and independent manner. Brucker to some extent identifies himself with the eclecticism, which was -somewhat paradoxically -popular in German philosophy at his time.
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In the 'Praefatio', Brucker explains the method of eclectic philosophy from the 16th to the eighteenth century in the following words:
Eclectic philosophy, after many wars, is indeed restored, victorious and powerful, having thrown off and trampled upon the sectarian mode of philosophizing. Having cast off this mean and unworthy yoke from human reason, and having cast off that slavish clinging to authority and prejudice of antiquity, some great and acute minds began to select true and universal principles, not by consulting the opinions of others, but by consulting their own [inner] lights. On these principles they began to erect conclusions and, thanks to their meditation, to build for themselves their own personal system of philosophy; these great minds began to store up truths from scattered sects, separating them from dogmas and connecting [the truths] to their convenient and apt place in the system. They did not approve or admit anything that did not appear demonstrated and certain according to the judgment of their reason and according to the clarity of truth.
19
 mentions Brucker by name in the entry (Diderot [1755], 273, 283, 292, 293) . Like Brucker, Diderot (1755) , 285-92, depicts ancient eclecticism as a multi-authored system of philosophy. Nevertheless, Diderot's entry on eclecticism as a whole is not without philosophical and theological dissent from Brucker: he tends to compare eclecticism and Christianity from a non-confessional and critical position (e.g. Diderot [1755] , 272), whereas Brucker looks at eclecticism, especially Platonism, from the view point of a Christian (Brucker [1742-67] , I: 21.10-23.25). For Brucker's influence on Diderot, please see Casini (1962) .
As this quotation conveys, eclectic philosophizing conformed to Brucker's requirement of genuine philosophy. It was system building. His words about the victorious progress of eclecticism pay tribute to the eclecticism of his own German philosophical culture. 20 As mentioned above, he also regards ancient Neoplatonism as a sort of eclecticism, but how does he fit ancient eclecticism into these historiographical categories?
II Historiographical assumptions in Brucker's reconstruction of the secta eclectica 24 Nevertheless, he claimed that Alexandrian philosophers introduced eclecticism into the thought of Plotinus and Porphyry, and that eclecticism was later on transferred to Athens through various Neoplatonists coming from Alexandria. 25 Brucker himself rejected the identification, just as Olearius had done. 26 He claimed, however, that Alexandrian philosophers introduced eclecticism, or rather, syncretism, into subsequent Platonism. These Alexandrian philosophers failed to fulfil the requirements of the genuine eclectic philosopher and degenerated into syncretism. The decisive impulse in this direction was not philosophical, but theological: Alexandrian philosophers adopted a syncretistic method taken from the religious sphere, implying that vulgar superstition was reconciled with Alexandrian philosophy in a syncretistic manner. 27 The claim is remarkable. Alexandrian philosophers' views on contemporary religions were complex but far from all-embracing and uncritical -Plotinus' Ennead II.9 Against the Gnostics being one example; Porphyry's criticism of Christianity  philosophy and his view on Platonism, especially ancient and Renaissance Neoplatonism, as a threat to Christianity, see also ibid. 193, , Brucker relies to a considerable extent on [Olearius] (1711). Olearius is not mentioned as the translator and author to the supplements, but Heumann (1715b), 331 n. z, Walch (1726), I: col. 594, and Brucker (1742-67) being another.
28 To Brucker, however, these Neoplatonists were all 'Alexandrians' and 'syncretists', and these terms, especially the former, remained in control until the end of the eighteenth century, in some countries even longer, after which its replacement, 'Neoplatonists', was coined, as I shall explain below. 29 Brucker's intervention into the philological and historical debate over the identity of Potamo was intriguing: He resolved the Potamo debate by claiming that the religious and cultural syncretism of Alexandria influenced Alexandrian philosophy decisively, not an isolated historical figure named Potamo, whosoever he was. At the same time, Brucker inserted Alexandrian philosophy into a conceptual scheme focused on system building -a scheme, which was to remain powerful in the ensuing history of philosophy.
The French thinker Denis Diderot summed up the seventeenth-and eighteenth-century debate over the identification of Potamo in his entry 'eclectisme', published in his Encyclopèdie (1751-72). Here he retained the identification. Moreover, he regarded the Potamo mentioned in the Vita Plotini as a philosopher practising a version of eclecticism in which several philosophical systems were combined into one. Diderot read Porphyry's vague terms πολλάκις ἓν (Vita Plotini 9.11) as πολλάκις εἰς ἓν, referring, according to Diderot, to Potamo combining several systems of philosophy into one. The Greek term for system (σύσ-τημα), however, is absent in Porphyry's Vita Plotini, as well as in Laertius' Lives I.21, so Diderot clearly read more into these passages than they could support.
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Rather curiously, Diderot regarded Potamo in the Vita Plotini as a father to an orphan in Plotinus' care -not as an orphan in Plotinus' care himself. This implied, to Diderot, that Potamo flourished as a philosopher at the end of the second century and the beginning of the third. Having made this dubious chronology, Diderot claimed that Potamo passed on his eclecticism to Ammonius Saccas, Plotinus' teacher mentioned in Vita Plotini 3. In this way Potamo's eclecticism entered Neoplatonsim. 31 Diderot subscribed to Brucker's view that Alexandrian philosophers introduced eclecticism (or rather syncretism) into Neoplatonism: Religious syncretism in Alexandria spread to moral philosophy and then to other parts of  28 For Porphyry's criticism of Christianity, see Barnes (1973) . 29 For the emergence of the term 'Neoplatonism' in the 1770s and 1780s, see Hager (1983) ; Meinhardt (1984); Franz (2003) . Alexandrian philosophy. Alexandrians approached philosophy just as they approached religion. They were timid minds unable to free themselves from prejudices of tradition and authorities, and they only re-circulated and re-organised existing philosophical views without demonstrating the heroic courage obligatory to a true eclectic philosopher, who should always be ready to abandon authorities and traditions. 32 Diderot also took over Brucker's interpretation of Neoplatonism and regarded ancient eclecticism as a multiauthored system of philosophy. As demonstrated by Casini, Diderot was directly influenced by Brucker in numerous instances, and this is one of them. 33 Diderot's entry thus corroborated Brucker's interpretation of the secta eclectica.
At this point we must separate two discussions. One is historical and concerns the question of whether the two references to Potamo in Laertius and Porphyry concern the same historical person or not. This issue is still debated, but I shall not enter the discussion. 34 Another discussion is conceptual and concerns the meaning of 'eclecticism' in Laertius and Brucker respectively. No matter whether the first question is answered by affirmation or negation, this second question remains unresolved. To the best of my knowledge, this second issue has not been addressed so far. 35 We should discriminate between the rather loose meaning of 'eclecticism' in ancient philosophy (e.g. Laertius' Lives I.21 and Clement of Alexandria's Stromata I.7) and the much more narrow meaning assigned to the term by Brucker. Brucker held that the method (methodus) of this ancient eclectic sect consisted in the philosopher's selection of doctrines or placita (corresponding to principia) from other sects; these doctrines or placita were subsequently combined into a system (systema) that was internally coherent. This endeavour was undertaken  32 Ibid., 271 [b] : 'La philosophie éclectique, qu'on appelle aussi le 'Platonisme réformé' et la 'philosophie alexandrine', prit naissance à Alexandrie en Egypte, c'est-à-dire au centre des superstitions. Ce ne fut d'abord qu'un sincrétisme de pratiques religieuses, adopté par les prêtres de l'Egypte, qui n'étant pas moins crédules sous le regne de Tibere qu'au tems d'Hérodote, parce que le caractere d'esprit qu'on tient du climat change difficilement, avoient toûjours l'ambition de posséder le système d'extravagances le plus complet qu'il y eût en ce genre. Ce sincrétisme passa de-là dans la morale, et dans les autres parties de la philosophie. Les philosophes assez éclairés pour sentir le foible des différens systèmes anciens, mais trop timides pour les abandonner, s'occuperent seulement à les réformer sur les découvertes du jour, ou plûtôt à les défigurer sur les préjugés courans: c'est ce qu'on appella 'platoniser', 'pythagoriser', etc.' 33 See references in n. 17 above. 34 See n. 2 above. 35 See references in n. 4 above.
in meditation, and the result was an 'edifice' (aedificium) of doctrines. In other words, Brucker thought that Neoplatonists were intent on the kind of system building outlined on page 168-169 above. The following words of Brucker are found on the opening page of the lengthy account of Neoplatonism, placed immediately after his account of Middle Platonism:
As we have narrated above, the Platonic sect gave birth to an eclectic philosophy of a monstrous kind and of a monstrous name, if the name [eclecticism] is assigned the original meaning. For a sect is said to be something which follows mainly one philosopher's way of philosophizing and the system of doctrines which he construed for himself; the eclectic method, on the other hand, is one which, from the propositions of all the sects, chooses those for itself, which are closest to the truth and suitable for being put together through their own [i.e. the eclectics'] meditations. On the basis of these [propositions or meditations] it [the eclectic method] builds its own edifice of doctrine [s] . Hence it is clear that the sectarian philosophy fights the eclectic to such a degree that they cannot possibly be forced into one single body. If we are willing fully to accept the appellation ['eclecticism'] , eclectic philosophy is not new, but very old, and is most characteristic of the most excellent men and all founders of sects."
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This quotation needs some clarification. The term 'sect' (secta) is used in two different senses. In the first line, Brucker uses the term in the neutral sense of a school preserving a body of philosophical theories, e.g. those of Plato, as was the case in Middle Platonism. In the third line Brucker uses the word in the negative sense of a group of philosophers who are intellectually unable to emancipate themselves from inherited philosophical traditions and to philosophise in a free and independent manner; these philosophers lack the intellectual robustness and courage required from the genuine philosopher, that is the eclectic philosopher, as described in the quotation on page 172 above. As the above quotation conveys, the very notion of an eclectic sect is an absurdity, since eclecticism and sectarianism denote two mutually exclusive methods. This quotation also reveals one of the paradoxes in Brucker's idea of eclecticism:  36 Brucker (1742-67), II: 189.4-14: 'Platonica, quam hucusque enarravimus, secta eclecticam genuit, monstrosi nominis generisque philosophiam, si nomen nativa significatione adhibeatur. Secta enim cum dicatur, quae unius potissimum philosophi rationem philosophandi, quodque sibi construxit, systema doctrinarum sequitur; eclectica vero methodus ea sit, quae ex omnium sectarum placitis ea sibi eligit, quae veritati propiora sunt, et propriis meditationibus iungi apta; exque iis proprium doctrinae excitat aedificium; clarum inde est, sectariam philosophiam adeo repugnare eclecticae, ut in unum redigi corpus nequeant. Nec si proprie appellationem accipiamus, eclectica philosophia nova est, sed antiquissima, maximisque viris sectarumque conditoribus omnibus usitatissima.' These opinions or truths are used as principles in their systems (189.28). Brucker regards this method as similar to the one used 'by us', including such figures as .
Although he conceived of eclecticism as something positive, he also maintained that eclecticism could degenerate into something negative, that is, if it was infected with sectarian modes of philosophizing. This is precisely what happened to the ancient eclectic sect, Neoplatonism.
The key concepts in Brucker's above description of ancient eclecticism are found in his own essentialistic statements about the nature of philosophy. He thus measures ancient Neoplatonism against the methodological ideal of eclecticism, as he understood the concept. This feature becomes even clearer in the pages following the above quotation, where he locates the 'origin of the eclectic sect' (origo sectae eclecticae) among the Egyptians.
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This methodological ideal of ancient eclectics, Brucker continues, resembles that held by prominent philosophers of his own time, e.g. Descartes and Leibniz. 38 If one compares the method assigned to ancient Neoplatonism with Brucker's generic statement about philosophy, obviously alluding to seventeenth-and eighteenth-century eclecticism (as cited on page 171-172 above), it turns out that they are very similar, reflecting Brucker's historically naive assumption that late antique and early modern philosophers adhered to the same method. This concept of ancient eclectic philosophers was not found in Laertius' Lives I.21.
In his account of Neoplatonism, Brucker makes at least two assumptions about ancient eclectics which are not present in Laertius or other ancient thinkers referring to eclectic philosophy. First, Brucker relates ancient eclecticism to the system concept: Ancient eclectic philosophizing, he claimed, was intent on system building. 39 Brucker is clearly anachronistic in his universal retrojection of a generic ideal of philosophizing onto the entire history of philosophy, including ancient Neoplatonism. 40 In his reconstruction of these past systems, he typically distorts Laertius and other ancient accounts of philosophers by interpreting the ἀρχαί of ancient philosophers as logical principles from which a deduction can be made (principia), whereas they had been intended as ontological principles. One example is Thales' theory that water is the beginning (ἀρχή) of the universe, which is clearly intended in the ontological meaning of the word, not in the logical meaning. 41  37 Brucker (1742-67), 38 Ibid., II: 190.1-2 39 Ibid., II: 189.4-190.32 40 Catana (2008 ), 35-113. Franz (2003 , 21-2, does not discern between these two meanings of 'eclecticism'. 41 For the anachronism of this concept in philosophy produced before the seventeenth century, see Catana (2008) , 63-113. For Brucker's dubious reconstruction of Thales' philosophy, see ibid., 63-72. Second, Brucker connects the concept of ancient eclecticism with another concept, syncretism (syncretismus). Although ancient philosophers had used the term 'syncretism', it was not used as a dialectical counterpart to 'eclecticism', and neither of the two concepts were conceived within a wider concept of philosophical method framed within the concept of a system of philosophy. 42 Even in Laertius' Lives I.21, 'syncretism' is not listed as a counterpart to 'eclecticism'. Nor had Olearius, Brucker's near-contemporary, related the two terms. 43 What are the consequences of Brucker's conceptual innovation in regard to Neoplatonism? Neoplatonists were 'infected' with syncretism, he holds. One instance is Proclus, whose reason and power of judgment, essential to system building, had been ruined by religious superstition and Platonic enthusiasm (furor or enthusiasmus). 44 Brucker routinely perpetuated this criticism of past philosophers with some inclination towards Platonism, so we should not infer from this judgement that he was familiar with Proclus' writings in great detail. 45 If only enthusiasm, understood as deificatio, had been an isolated phenomenon in Proclus but otherwise extrinsic to Neoplatonism, the damage would not have been too great, but it was a general feature of Neoplatonism; deificatio was regarded as the highest form of felicity and the aim of philosophizing among Neoplatonists -a conception that conflicted with Protestant theology, since it left little room for Scripture as a privileged source of truth and moral instruction. 46 This aim of philosophy, deificatio and its enthusiasm, also corrupted the Platonic system of philosophy as understood by Neoplatonists, since it ruined the power of judgement, vital to system building. For this reason, among others, the ancient secta eclectica was first of all a syncretistic sect in the eyes of Brucker. 47 In his 'Praefatio', he had stated explicitly that the Platonic theory of furor was an error that had entered Christianity, and that his motivation for writing  42 Here I agree with Donini (1988) , 21 n. 15. Walch (1726) , I: cols 593-4, had employed a conceptual scheme in which syncretism was the dialectical counterpart to eclecticism. 43 [Olearius] (1711), 1218-20 44 E.g. Brucker (1742-67) , 45 Brucker raises the same accusation against alleged syncretists like Pico and Ficino (Brucker [1742-67] , IV: 59.38-60.4), who picked up the "Alexandrian philosophy" (ibid., IV: 59.3). Brucker claims that Bruno's undisciplined imagination and weak power of judgement led him to accept prejudices, turning his system into a 'monster' (monstrum) rather than an apt and rational system (ibid., V: 38.15-20) . In fact, Bruno never intended to build a system of philosophy; see Catana (2008 ), 35-62. 46 Brucker (1742 , I: 21.10-23.11 47 Ibid., this history of philosophy was to combat this error. 48 He spelled out this contradiction between ancient Platonism and Christianity on several occasions -Proclus being the main target. 49 Brucker denied that Platonic furor or enthusiasmus was caused by cognitive content. According to him, the Neoplatonists' so-called noetic ascent, or amor, was a non-cognitive state, falsely interpreted by the Neoplatonists themselves as an elevated and cognitive state. According to Brucker, however, their enthusiasm was caused by a medical condition -an excesses of melancholy producing simulacra and images in their disturbed brains. 50 This accusation was not new. Ancient Neoplatonists themselves had debated the divide between physiologically and noetically caused states of enthusiasm. 51 Renaissance thinkers with some inclination towards Neoplatonism had distinguished such charlatans, suffering from medical and physiological states, from genuine contemplative men, who undertake a real noetic ascent, whose cognitive content was not doubted. 52 and seventeenth-century eclectic philosophers, but chose to offer one single and comprehensive account of all philosophers belonging to this ancient sect. This choice was based on his belief that all ancient eclectics shared a common impulse (religiously motivated syncretism and sectarianism), and this feature justified the implicit assumption that ancient eclecticism was a multi-authored, propositional complex developed by thinkers scattered all over the Mediterranean region over a period of three hundred years. In his accounts of past philosophers, Brucker typically outlines the historical circumstances (circumstantiae) relevant to their systems of philosophy, and then passes on to the principles in their respective systems. These principles are typically of a metaphysical nature, and from them he 'deduces' doctrines within the various compartments of philosophy, ending up with their ramifications in practical philosophy. 54 To note in passing, these connections are not the result of logical deductions in the strict sense, but Brucker clings to the terminology typical of logic (e.g. principium, deduco, etc.), probably in order to give his account an air of certainty and authority. He follows a parallel procedure in the case of the ancient eclectic sect.
There he first gives a historical outline of the philosophers belonging to this sect, though without entering their respective contribution to the collective, philosophical system. 55 He then offers some general observations on this movement (generales observationes de philosophia sectae eclecticae), including some religious reservations against the sect, claiming that these observations and religious weaknesses are representative of the system of ancient eclecticism as a whole. 56 These general observations correspond roughly to the circumstances normally expounded in connection with individual thinkers in his history of philosophy.
Finally, Brucker exhibits the system of the ancient eclectics. Here it is possible to discern the contours of his usual procedure, beginning with theoretical philosophy and proceeding to practical philosophy. 57 In this reconstruction he cites various passages from different eclectic philosophers, e.g. Plotinus, Porphyry, Macrobius and the Chaldaean Oracles, in order to reconstruct a single system of philosophy worked out collectively by these Neoplatonists. Needless to say, he typically cites these sources out of context. However, this reconstruction follows from his own precepts for the historian of philosophy, who should indeed identify and articulate such a system. 58 The corresponding methodological ideal, however, was foreign to ancient and Renaissance Platonism, as argued above. Admittedly, a Neoplatonist like Proclus was no stranger to axiomatic-deductive modes of argumentation and exposition, but that in itself does not turn Proclus into a system builder as conceived by Brucker.
Brucker's reconstruction sets out with an account of so-called eclectic dialectics, explaining Plotinus' criticism of, and alternative to, Aristotle's Categories. Here Brucker relies on Ennead VI.1. This account anticipates his exposition of Plotinus' theory of emanation and its theory of ontological dependencies. 59 Brucker then moves on to the foundational metaphysical principles in eclecticism and its conception of the divinity. 60 The first principle in this system is that of the One and its overflowing, as explained in Plotinus' Ennead V.1. Brucker reasons that the eclectic system of philosophy was an 'emanative system of philosophy'.
61 In order to fit Plotinus' texts into his system concept, he interprets these passages as if the One denoted not only a beginning (Greek ἀρχή, Latin principium) in the ontological sense, but also in the logical sense of a premise in a syllogism: The One is the foundational principle in his entire system, it is the very 'key' (clavis) that opens up the entire edifice of his 'emanative' system, as Brucker explains.
62 Aristotle too had used the term ἀρχή in the logical sense of a premise in a syllogism, but he distinguished this logical sense from the ontological sense. 63 On this background one wonders whether the Bruckerian "key" to the eclectic system is more suitable for "locking up" the ideas of Neoplatonism than for "unlocking" them. At any rate, the first principle thus identified by Brucker is not only a first principle in Plotinus' system, it is the first principle in the system of ancient eclecticism and features, according to Brucker, in various Neoplatonic thinkers belonging to the sect. 64  58 Ibid., I: 15.10-18. For a critical analysis of the Bruckerian interpretation of Proclus as a system builder, see Beierwaltes (1987 The second principle in the eclectic system is Intellect (intellectus), ontologically dependent on the One. Again, Brucker relies on Plotinus' Ennead V.1. 65 The hypostasis Soul (anima) is ontologically dependent upon the second principle, Intellect, but is not regarded as a principle by Brucker. 66 The third principle is the World Soul (anima mundi). Together with the two other principles, it became, Brucker explains, a rival among ancient eclectics to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.
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The doctrine of the three principles in the eclectic system, as reconstructed by Brucker, implies at least four things. First, Porphyry's ordering of Plotinus' Enneads, crucial to Brucker's exposition of the eclectic system, is reversed in Brucker's account: Roughly speaking, Porphyry had placed ethics first (Ennead I), then natural philosophy (Enneads II-III), psychology (Ennead IV) and metaphysics (Enneads V-VI); Brucker begins with metaphysics, where he locates three principles in the eclectic system on the basis of Ennead V.1; he then moves on to natural philosophy (including psychology) and ends with ethics, citing Ennead I.2. Brucker's order was new, and it was instrumental to modern Plotinus scholarship. 68 Second, Brucker's order was not only novel and somewhat ahistorical and formalistic, it also conformed with his otherwise outspoken hostility to Neoplatonic ethics. According to Brucker, the aim of Platonic philosophy was the individual Platonic philosopher's experience of furor.
69 Ancient eclectic philosophers explained this cognitive state by means of the four cardinal virtues, as they understood the virtues. Brucker, however, reduced this psychological state to a non-cognitive state caused by an excess of melancholic fluids in the brain, provoking all sorts of phantasms. 70 This medical rejection of furor fitted well into his explicit theological rejection of Platonism as a kind of philosophical theology; this objection was clearly stated in the preface to the entire work.
71 In Brucker's systematic account of the ancient eclectic sect, Platonic furor and its related doctrine of virtue ethics are thus presented as an insignificant appendix to the metaphysical system, even though furor was an important aim of this Let me move on to the third implication of Brucker's determination of the three principles in the eclectic system. The ἀρχαί in Plotinus' thought were not intended as hypotheses in an axiomatic-deductive argument, but as first principles in the ontological sense. As such, the One is non-discursive and non-propositional. Brucker, however, imposes a uniform, propositional rationality on a philosophical theory, i.e. Neoplatonism, in which the limit between non-discursive and discursive rationality is essential.
Fourth, Brucker claims that the eclectic emanative system, based on the idea of the overflowing of the One, was a serious distortion of Plato's system, which was a 'dualistic system of philosophy', based on two principles, god and matter. 72 The emanative system of philosophy resembled -at least in the eyes of Brucker -the atheistic and monistic system of Spinoza, which Brucker perceived as a threat to Christian transcendentalism. 73 This theological objection becomes very clear in Brucker's criticism of Neoplatonic virtue ethics, as we shall see below.
Having established the One, Intellect and World Soul as principles in the system of eclecticism, Brucker considers the identification of these three principles with the Christian Trinity. Augustine had explained the theory of hypostases among the platonici against the background of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, complaining that the Platonists had not dealt with the subject in a clear manner (De civitate dei X.23, 29). 74 well with his ambition governing his history of philosophy as a whole, to detach Christianity's intellectual roots from Platonism, and to defend a purified version of Christianity and its intellectual genealogy leaving greater scope for Christian revelation. 76 After Brucker's theological excursus, he moves on to various ramifications of these principles in natural philosophy, especially in psychology and cosmology. Once again, Plotinus' Enneads are used as an important source.
77 Eclectic theology is the next subject considered in his systematic exposition. The account of this topic is not based on Plotinus, however, but on Iamblichus, especially his De mysteriis aegyptiorum. Brucker seems to assume that the system reconstructed in Plotinus' writings also underlies Iamblichus' theology. 78 Finally, Brucker reaches the so-called practical part of the eclectic system, its virtue theory, ultimately derived from the first-mentioned three principles. 79 The 'Plotinian psychology', which in turn presupposes Plotinus' hierarchy of being, is the foundation of the moral philosophy in eclecticism. 80 In his account of eclectic psychology, Brucker observes Plotinus' view in Ennead I.1.11-12 that the human soul cannot sin by itself, but only when it is joined with the body in a compound; Brucker notes that this is a 'miserable foundation for a moral philosophy'. 81 Brucker also notes that Plotinus' idea of the One as the source and aim of the individual soul is foundational to the Platonic theory of enthusiasm -a view which he elaborates at length elsewhere. 82 Brucker reports the various degrees of virtue among Neoplatonists, but he ends up condemning their virtue theory in strong terms as utterly unchristian.
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The higher virtues, as the ancient eclectics, e.g. Proclus, understood and practised them could certainly not pass as genuine Christian virtues, according to Brucker, although some Platonists had claimed this. In fact, this eclectic doctrine of virtue amounted to nothing but 'stupid emulation' (stulta aemulatio). Neoplatonism in particular, that had entered the religion and now posed a danger to it -and his account of ancient eclecticism was a Lutheran counterblast to this challenge, presented in the form of an unbiased, systematic exposition. Brucker reinserts revelation into a privileged position and dethrones the Platonic theological and ethical pretention to oneness with the divine through the exercise of the higher virtues. Although Brucker did not invent the terms 'Neoplatonism' and 'Neoplatonist', his historiographical concept of a system of philosophy, as well as his ideas of eclecticism and syncretism, were decisive to those subsequent German historians who did invent these terms, since they were shaped by the semantics of these three Bruckerian concepts. Hager and Meinhardt have not paid sufficient attention to this conceptual dependence upon Brucker's key concepts. In fact, these eighteenth-century German historians of philosophy regarded Neoplatonism as ancient Alexandrian eclecticism, and they justified the label 'Neoplatonism' on the basis of Brucker's distinction between genuine Platonism and the so-called eclectic, or rather syncretistic, Platonism of the Alexandrians. The German historian of philosophy Büsching, among the first to use the German phrase for 'Neoplatonism', expressed this view eloquently in 1774:
IV
Hence, they [the Alexandrian philosophers] were, and were called, eclectics. However, they preferred to be seen as adherents of Plato, whose doctrines on god, soul and the universe they liked better than what other philosophers had thought about these matters. Moreover, they preferred to be called Platonic philosophers. Posterity, however, has  85 Hager (1983) and Meinhardt (1984) called them Neoplatonists [neuen Platoniker] in order to distinguish them from the ancient and genuine Platonists. One would not inflict any injury upon them by calling them enthusiasts, since their system and its ornament bears witness to the fact that they were men of this kind.
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For Büsching and subsequent historians of philosophy of his period, the term 'Neoplatonism' thus came to denote a discontinuity in the Platonic tradition, a corruption of genuine ancient Platonism, and a low point in the history of philosophy. 87 The Germans were at the forefront of late eighteenth-and early nineteenthcentury scholarship, and their historiographical categories and evaluations were perceived as authoritative and reliable, although they were at times imbued with considerable religious prejudices. However, given the status of these categories and evaluations in the scholarly community, they spread to other countries. One example is the British philosopher James Mill. In 1804, he attacked  86 Büsching (1772-4), II: 471 spoke of the 'Ursprung der eklektischen Philosophie der neuern Platoniker'. Ibid., II: 472, Büsching distinguished genuine ancient Platonism from Neoplatonism: 'Also waren und hieβen sie [Alexandrian philosophers, mentioned ibid., II: 471-2], Eklektiker. Jedoch sie wolten insonderheit für Anhänger des Plato angesehen seyn, dessen Lehrsätze von Gott, der Seele und Welt, ihnen besser gefielen, als was andere Philosophen davon gelehret hatten, und lieβen sich also auch gern Platoniker nennen. Die Nachwelt aber hat sie zum Unterschied von den alten und ächten Platonikern, die neuen Platoniker genannt. Man thut ihnen nicht unrecht, wenn man sie für Enthusiasten ausgiebt, denn ihr System und desselben Ausschmüchung, bezeuget es, dass sie dergleichen gewesen.' For the theological and medical accusation against enthusiasts in the seveneenth and eighteenth centuries, see Heyd (1995) , 44-92. 87 The following historians of philosophy can be seen in the historiographical tradition established by Brucker: Meiners (1782) (ignored by Meinhardt [1984] ) spoke of Neoplatonism ('NeuPlatonisches Philosophie', 6, 7, 9 et passim), or the Neoplatonists ('neuen Platonikern', 8, or 'neuern Platonikern', 9, et passim). He characterized these Neoplatonists as eclectics, led by Potamo and Ammonius, who combined different philosophical systems (9-16; 'System' is mentioned on 10, 13, 14, 16). Eberhard (1788), 211-221, picks up the main features of this tradition, reusing the term 'Neoplatonic' ('neu-platonischen', 211; or 'Neuplatonische', e.g. 212). He characterizes the Neplatonic philosophy as 'eclectic' ('eclectischen', 212), and he brings forward Brucker's contention that the Alexandrians philosophers construed a system (213). Eberhard (1788) refers approvingly to Brucker (1742-67) (219), and he regards Justian's closure of Plato's Academy as an adequate ending of 'heathen' ('heidnische'), that is, Hellenic philosophy, after the rise of Christianity (222). Fülleborn (1793), 70-85, uses the term 'Neoplatonism' and its cognates as a well-established term, largely relying on the tradition going back to Brucker and Meiners. Buhle (1796-1804) , IV, refers to Brucker (1742-67) (181): Buhle uses the term 'Neoplatonism' and its cognates (e.g. 211), and he reports several of features that had become standard in the interpretation of Neoplatonism (183-215). However, Buhle is among the first to reject Mosheim's theological and orthodox Protestant criticism of Neoplatonism (215-9). Thomas Taylor's interpretation of Plato for its debt to these abominable "Alexandrian" philosophers. 88 As Mill's vehement attack testifies, it was not necessary at this point in history to argue for a negative view of these Alexandrians -everyone assumed that they were bad philosophers, and all a critic had to do was to claim that some Plato interpretation was associated with Neoplatonism for it to lose credibility in the scholarly community.
Hegel later questioned the legitimacy of the term 'Neoplatonism' in his lectures on the history of philosophy, pointing out the presence of non-Platonic elements as well. He also denied the common characterization of Alexandrian philosophy as eclectic, in the negative sense of the word; that is, as an unoriginal and incoherent sampling of various philosophical doctrines. Nevertheless, he still regarded Alexandrian philosophy as an all-embracing synthesis of all past philosophical systems -Plotinus' philosophy being a rare example of an internally coherent synthesis.
89 Although Hegel's positive evaluation and serious exposition of the so-called Alexandrian philosophy marks a turning point in the reception of Neoplatonism, his interpretation was still indebted to previous interpretations on at least two counts. First, as with Brucker, Büsching and other historians of philosophy, Hegel held that this development of the Platonic tradition did not bring the Neoplatonists closer to genuine Platonism; on the contrary, it was very far from the original Platonism. Second, Hegel retained the characterisation of Neoplatonism, and of Plotinus in particular, as eclectic, though not of a defective and sectarian kind, intent on system building. Thereby he remained largely within the historiographical tradition initiated by Brucker.
Eduard Zeller carried on the tradition going back to Brucker, though not without polemical outbursts. Zeller is above all the late nineteenth-century historian of philosophy whose account of ancient Greek philosophy is still important, still reprinted (the latest reprint from 2006) and still cited as an authority. As observed recently by Christoph Horn, Zeller rejected the concept of Alexandrian philosophy as 'superficial' and inadequate, and Zeller was clearly targeting the interpretation and evaluation of Neoplatonism found in  88 [Mill] (1809), 191-200, 211 , uses the phrase 'Alexandrian' for ancient Neoplatonic philosophers, typically with strong negative connotations. 89 We find an exposition of Neoplatonism in Hegel (1959) , XIX: 3-96. For non-Platonic elements in Neoplatonism, see ibid., XIX: 10, 40. For Hegel's rejection of Alexandrian philosophy as eclectic, see ibid., XIX: 33. For Alexandrian philosophy (including Plotinus') as a synthesis of previous systems, see ibid., XIX: 33. The last-mentioned claim should be seen on the background of Hegel's general view on the history of philosophy as a series of philosophical systems which are 'aufgehoben' into subsequent ones; see ibid., earlier generations of nineteenth-century German historians of philosophy. 90 Nevertheless, Zeller characterized Neoplatonism as eclecticism, verging on syncretism, and he adopted the Bruckerian system concept in his assessment of the movement. 91 At this point it should be observed that Zeller, and other modern historians of philosophy, did not understand eclecticism as Brucker had done -to Zeller, it merely meant some random selection of doctrines from the philosophical tradition, not the same as in the thought of Brucker. Laertius, Brucker and Zeller thus upheld three different conceptions of eclecticism. 92 Zeller also retained Brucker's division between Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism. In short, Brucker's influence is considerable, even after Zeller.
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V Problems in Brucker's reconstruction of the secta eclectica
There are several problems in the reconstruction of the secta eclectica. First, it construes a discontinuity between Platonists and this eclectic sect, i.e. Neoplatonism, on the basis of a methodological ideal, which was absent and unin- 90 Horn (2010), 138. Ibid., 138-9, Horn identifies Schleiermacher's Plato interpretation of 1804 as the first attack on the so-called Neoplatonic interpretation of Plato that had any substantial influence upon German scholarship. I think it would be reasonable to pay attention to the antiPlatonic campaign -attacking Neoplatonists on theological, philosophical, philological and medical grounds -that emanated from Leipzig publishers between 1715 and 1744, counting figures like Olearius (1711), Heumann (1715a) and (1715b), Hansch (1716), Mosheim (1725), and Brucker (1742-67) ; the latter certainly did have a considerable influence on German scholarship, and on the history of philosophy in particular. Remarkably, this widespread anti-Platonic campaign has largely been ignored among historians of philosophy working on the eighteenth century. 91 For Zeller's use of the historiographical concept eclecticism in regard to Neoplatonism, see Zeller (1923) , III.1: 547-64. See also the critical discussion of Zeller on this point in Donini (1988) and Beierwaltes (1989) Second, Brucker's novel way of presenting Neoplatonic philosophy, namely in the form of a system based on metaphysical principles, implies that a variety of philosophical areas, such as natural philosophy and political philosophy, are best explained when understood against the background of these asserted metaphysical principles. This unilateral, metaphysical contextualization hinders us from understanding areas in Neoplatonic thought that may be explained on their own, or which may be contextualized to fields outside the alleged system. 95 Third, the phrase 'eclectic sect' negates the explicit statements of intent of ancient Neoplatonists, claiming that they are legitimate heirs to the philosophy of Plato and the "pre-Platonists" (e.g. Plotinus, Ennead V.1.8).
96 This self-understanding conflicts with Brucker's definition of eclectics, who choose doctrines from all sects. 97 Brucker and his like-minded colleagues want us to believe that what mattered to Neoplatonists was to combine the doctrines or principles from the systems of the various ancient philosophical schools almost as if they were placed on an equal footing, with the exception of Plato's philosophy. 98 This way of thinking certainly obscures the fact that some Neoplatonists regarded themselves as legitimate heirs not only to Plato, but also to the "pre-Platonists", including Parmenides and Heraclitus, to whom Plotinus refers frequently. O'Meara (2003) . 96 For Plotinus and the Presocratics, see Stamatellos (2007) . 97 Compare with Brucker (1742-67) , II: 189.4-14, as cited in n. 36 above. 98 For this tendency, see also Meiners (1782) , 10, who claims that Alexandrian philosophers sought to harmonize different philosophical schools, especially the Platonic and the Aristotelian. 99 For Plotinus' use of Presocratic thinkers, see Stamatellos (2007). even in the vague sense of the word. In fact, one could ask on a more general level, where is the evidence for the claim that Neoplatonists regarded their method as eclectic? One may even ask how widespread this method was in ancient philosophy. I find it hard to come up with more than a few insubstantial examples.
Fifth, Brucker's complaint against Neoplatonists, that they were sectarians and syncretists with a corrupt faculty of reason, was accompained by a new accusation; Neoplatonists excelled in allegorical reasoning, though not because they were excellent exegetes of Plato, but because this mode of reasoning was the only form open to them and their disturbed brains, ruined as they were by enthusiasm.
100 This accusation becomes standard some time after Brucker.
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Though it is true that Neoplatonists occasionally did advance allegorical interpretations, and that allegorical interpretation is subject to all the weaknesses of unrestricted subjectivism, two things need to be pointed out. The first is that allegorical interpretation was an integral part of Plato's works, as he admits himself. 102 Hence it was not completely illegitimate to pursue a hermeneutics, which sought to uncover such allegorical meanings. The second thing is that the label 'allegorical interpretation' is not a full and adequate indication of the methods employed by ancient and Renaissance Neoplatonists. In addition, they also used standard philosophical methods such as analysis of philosophical concepts, theories and arguments. Some Neoplatonists, e.g. Proclus, openly profess a pluralistic hermeneutics when faced with Plato's writings. 103 The accusation of being allegorical implied, however, that subsequent historians of philosophy tended to ignore these non-allegorical analyses.
Sixth, Brucker's codification of philosophical originality, in the form of successful construction of philosophical systems, implies that philosophical discourse that falls outside this form -the commentary, for instance -fails to qualify as proper philosophy worthy of the attention of the historian of philosophy. These are "only" commentaries and can be ignored in general histories of philosophy. However, as Richard Sorabji and George Karamanolis have recently demonstrated, it would be a gross mistake to reduce ancient commentators to anything like that; they were most certainly able to produce original and chal- 100 See for instance the exposition of Proclus method in Brucker (1742-67) , II: 325.20-31, 333.12-23, 359.30-37. 101 E.g. Tennemann (1798 -1819 , VI: 10, 17, juxtaposes the Neoplatonists' allegorical interpretation of Plato with a proper systematic exposition. 102 E.g. Plato, Gorgias 493A-C. For this theme, see Tarrant (2000) . Seventh, the characterisation of the secta eclectica as syncretist had normative implications. Syncretism was perceived as an inferior philosophy and reproached by Brucker. This applies to syncretism in both ancient and Renaissance Neoplatonism, especially the latter, which was perceived as a real threat to the kind of theology favoured by Brucker. 105 This normative degradation was reinforced by external factors, especially the institutionalization of the history of philosophy, relying heavily on Brucker's conceptual schemes. This occurred when courses in the history of philosophy began to flourish in philosophy departments in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and this institutional setting gave Brucker's narrative momentum. Brucker's idea of the history of philosophy, including his historiographical concepts like 'system of philosophy', 'eclecticism' and 'syncretism', was affirmed and adopted by most eighteenth-, nineteenth-and twentieth-century historians of philosophy writing general histories of philosophy, Friedrick Copleston perhaps being the latest example.
106
Given this educational and institutional context, Neoplatonism was left little room for fair play, since Bruckerian precepts had the upper hand. This unfavourable historiographical determination of Neoplatonism induced subsequent historians of philosophy to treat it disrespectfully in their general histories of philosophy, and it probably led quite a few nineteenth-and twentieth-century philosophy departments to scale down their introduction to Neoplatonism, thus cementing its low status.
Finally, Brucker's assessment of Egyptian or Alexandrian philosophy, decisive to the development of the eclectic sect, meant that Egyptian philosophy was now seen as an intrusion and distortion of Greek philosophy. Compared with earlier accounts of the history of philosophy, Brucker stood out by identifying the beginning of the history of philosophy in Greece, namely with Thales, and by regarding philosophical movements in the Middle East as distortions of that Greek philosophy. Earlier Renaissance accounts had identified the Middle East, Egypt in particular, as the origin of Greek philosophy. In the Renaissance  104 Sorabji (1990) ; Karamanolis (2006) tradition of prisca theologia (ancient theology), Egypt had been seen as the source of Plato's philosophy. 107 After Brucker, however, Europe's intellectual roots were to be found inside Europe itself.
108
These problems can be seen as objections against Brucker raised from the perspective of modern historical scholarship, which seeks a critical account of past philosophers that is independent of confessional ties. Brucker, however, was no such scholar. As he states in his preface, his motivation for writing the massive Latin volumes on philosophy's past was to serve Christianity and its church.
109 For him, it was less important if Neoplatonism was separated from the earlier Platonic tradition in an unhistorical manner, or if Europe's philosophical tradition was somewhat misrepresented as a self-contained unit; the important point to him was that the Neoplatonic interpretation of Plato was disqualified, because it posed a theological threat.
This disqualification meant that Christians could now deal with Plato without accepting his metaphysical and ethical idea about divine likeness, which was strongly emphasised by the Neoplatonists, and which bypassed Scripture as a privileged source for our knowledge of truth and bliss. The Plato reconstructed by Brucker was one in which deificatio and furor played no central role, if any at all; it was a reconstruction in which Plato was primarily a metaphysician presenting a doctrine of ideas. The passages in Phaedo 69C and Theaetetus 176A-B, vital to ancient Platonism and its theory of divine likeness, were now out of sight; Alcinous' Didaskalikos 28 and Plotinus' Enneads I.2.1 and IV.7.10 were no longer considered central to our understanding of the aim of Platonic philosophy. 110 VI Brucker' Let us look back, however, to those among the ancients, who were less infected by detestable syncretism, as the school of Plotinus, and who must therefore be considered to have reported Plato's doctrines in a somewhat purer form. Among these, the first place is unquestionably owed to Cicero. In the Academica, an elegant and brief treatise, he reported, in a very eloquent form, Plato's doctrines, which were taught in the Academy. To this we can rightly add Apuleius and also Alcinous, who, most satisfactory of all, paid attention to the order and connection in the Platonic philosophy … 112 Accordingly, Brucker uses Cicero and the Middle Platonists Alcinous and Apuleius to present Plato as a system builder. Brucker interpretes the two ἀρχαί (matter and God) reported in Plato's Timaeus 32C-33A and in Alcinous' Didaskalikos 9 as the two general theories, so-called principles of Plato's system, from which Plato allegedly deduced the doctrines in his system. 113 This system under- 111 For Plato's philosophy, see Brucker (1742-67) lies Plato's otherwise unordered dialogues, Brucker holds. 114 In fact, these ἀρχαί were not logical premises, principles, in the Timaeus and Didaskalikos, but ἀρχαί in the ontological sense of beginning. Neither Cicero, Alcinous nor Apuleius assigned a system to Plato, at least in the sense used by Brucker. Moreover, Brucker did not offer a Middle Platonic account of Plato. Instead, he used these Middle Platonists -especially Alcinous -as a pretext for a reconstruction of Plato's philosophy that was entirely his own, and which was deeply dependent upon his system concept. The Middle Platonists certainly did offer pedagogical systematizations of Plato's philosophy, but they were different from that of Brucker. 115 On the background of this misreading, Brucker uses Alcinous as a guide to Plato's system, claiming that it was a 'dualistic system of philosophy'. This system is then presented in opposition to the Neoplatonic 'emanative system of philosophy'. 116 Hence, Brucker reasoned, genuine Platonism was fundamentally different from Neoplatonism.
 114 Brucker (1742-67), I: 669.13-23, as cited in n. 112 above. 115 Compare with Tigerstedt (1974) and (1977), who does not examine the meaning of Brucker's concept system of philosophy, and who therefore fails to differentiate Brucker's introduction of this historiographical systematization from the systematizations of the Middle Platonists. Tigerstedt (1974) , 68, thus ignores that Brucker imposed this category on Plato, and that it was foreign to the Neoplatonists: 'But though Tennemann's Kantian interpretation of Plato did not carry conviction, he nevertheless bequeathed two ideas of great importance to the Platonic scholars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The first was the belief that Plato had a philosophic system. This assumption was, of course, no invention of Tennemann's, for it was more or less shared by all earlier Platonists, save the New Academy, and can be traced back to Plato's immediate successors in the Old Academy, Speusippus and Xenocrates, though it culminated in the Neoplatonists.' Compare also with Burnyeat (2001) , 106 who states: 'Alcinous' Plato is still a systematic thinker, albeit in a Hellenistic rather than NeoPlatonic mould'. If 'systematic' implies that Alcinous' professed a system in the Bruckerian sense of the word, I disagree. I also disagree with Franz (2003) , 24, who argues that Brucker re-introduced Plato's system as it had been explained among these Middle Platonists. For a full analysis of Brucker's interpretation of Plato, see Catana (2008), 73-94, 109-113. 116 For the view that Plato's dualistic system was perverted into an emanative system by Neoplatonists, see Brucker (1742-67) , II: 364.4-9: 'Quod ut facilius fieret, relicto, quod Plato assumerat, systemate dualistico, emanativum ab iis ex philosophia Orientali revocatum et admissum, et per varios emanationum fontes, gradus, naturas, modos, classes, totus rerum et visibilium et invisibilium orbis, maxime vero infinita naturarum spiritualium et inteligibilium series deducta est.' Rather inconsistently, Brucker (1742-67) , I: 695.30-37, contends that Plato's doctrine of ideas is a third principle in his system, on which his theology, metaphysics, and his natural and moral philosophy hinge. Here Brucker seems to contradict his claim about a dualistic system in Plato. This distance between Plato's dualistic system of philosophy and the Neoplatonic emanative system of philosophy is underlined by Brucker's claim that the Neoplatonic eclecticism originated from Egypt, first of all Alexandria, not from Greece; see Brucker (1742-67) , II: 190-3.
Conclusion
I think there are lessons to be learned from the above analysis. One is that we, as historians of philosophy, do not have good reasons to accept the assumption that the Neoplatonists collaborated on a single and highly sophisticated theoretical complex, an eclectic system of philosophy. It is implausible that such a project could get off the ground, given the vast distances in time, place and philosophical preferences of the co-writers involved. Besides, it is in urgent need of textual evidence. Also, it does not accommodate the explicit statements of intent advanced by the Neoplatonists themselves.
Furthermore, two specific problems stand out in relation to Neoplatonism. First, the characterization of Neoplatonism as a system of philosophy, which is more or less coherent internally, invites us to understand the complex of philosophical theories pertaining to Neoplatonism as a self-contained and inward-looking unit; it hinders us from understanding the connections made by so-called Neoplatonists between philosophical and non-philosophical areas. As outlined above, the application of the concepts 'eclecticism' and 'system of philosophy' to Neoplatonism introduces a series of problems to our interpretation of the texts themselves. Second, the divide between Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism is justified on the part of Brucker by means of assumptions that are untenable. Hence it becomes very difficult to maintain a divide between the two periods which is not only chronological, but which concerns the very nature of these two phases of Platonism. I think we ought to abandon the divide completely, since it cannot be justified in the essentialistic manner proposed by Brucker. Given the fact that the division obscures more than it reveals, we would be better off without it.
